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Abstract: This article examines the way that ethics underpin and affect audience
participation in contemporary theatre, illustrated in the performance practice of
British-German ensemble Gob Squad. It looks at how a proliferation of participa-
tory practices has opened up a space for ethics to be reconfigured, and establishes
that the ethics of participation may intimate that a ‘good’ performance is inter-
changeable with the idea of an ‘authentic’ performance. It emphasises a double
dimension to the ethics of participation: the first is concerned with the self and
the second is about everyone else, drawing on the corresponding theories of Nich-
olas Ridout (2009) and Erving Goffman (1959). Importantly, the article disentan-
gles participation gone wrong and brings into view a new categorisation of spec-
tator which I am calling the ‘dis-spectator,’ who deliberately challenges the struc-
tures and processes of the performance. At the centre of the discussion are a
group of hecklers in the audience of Gob Squad’sWar and Peace (2016), and their
targeted jeering at a participant-spectator. My analysis develops a taxonomy of
dis-spectatorship that outlines varying levels of transgressive behaviour from
testing out the boundaries of participation to sabotaging the performance. Lastly,
I call attention to a lack of consideration given to care and responsibility in partic-
ipatory practices, which can leave participants in a precarious position.
Keywords: Gob Squad, audience participation, ethics, emancipated spectator,
authenticity, Jacques Rancière, Erving Goffman
On 8 June 2016, I attended a performance of War and Peace by British-German
collective Gob Squad at the Nottingham Playhouse. The devised production is a
modern day attempt to address one of Leo Tolstoy’s concerns: “if it is possible to
live a moral life in an ethically imperfect world?” (Gob Squad, “Current Projects”).
The premise for the performance is that a group of artists are holding a salon,
reminiscent of the gatherings conducted in high society Russia at the beginning
of the nineteenth century. The topic of conversation is War and Peace (1869), a
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‘heavy’ book written a century and a half ago, and how the novel intersects with
contemporary society.
Before the audience are let into the theatre, the performers emerge out of the
entrance and begin to mingle and interview awaiting spectators. Once inside the
auditorium, the performers begin to take to the stage with their interviewees and
recount into a microphone a series of facts about them, beginning with their name
and where they come from and progressing to details about their special talent or
father’s occupation. From the interviewees, a small group of spectators is invited
to join Gob Squad in the salon. They are motioned towards a table at the front of
stage right and offered a seat and a glass of fine champagne. Here the participant-
spectators will observe and contemplate their relationship to the performance
while being filmed and projected on to large screens on stage. Over the course of
the evening, the audience are introduced to a procession of characters from War
and Peace and beyond, as scenes unfold from shifting viewpoints. At regular in-
tervals the Gob Squad performers ask the salon participants about their own per-
ception of war, freedom and privilege.
It was during a Q&A exchange between a performer and participant that I
witnessed a striking example of what I am calling ‘participation gone wrong,’ in
reference to those moments when spectators divert from their intended role and
the parameters for participation set out by the practitioner. The incident involved
a group of hecklers in the audience and their targeted jeering at an overly zealous
participant. This moment highlighted the precarious relationship between ethics
and participatory performance and brought acute attention to the emergence of
transgressive audience behaviour.
Performances by Gob Squad are in part distinguished by the way that “the
audience are often asked to step beyond their traditional role as passive specta-
tors and bear witness to the results” (Gob Squad, “About Us”). Reflecting on my
own bearing witness of this stepping beyond, this essay will critically examine the
role that ethics play in supporting and troubling audience engagement in Gob
Squad’s work, specifically in relation to their productions of War and Peace
(2016; still ongoing) andWestern Society (2013; still ongoing). Alongside my anal-
ysis of their practice, I will also draw on the insights gained in an interview that I
conducted with Gob Squad performer Sharon Smith in July 2016.
Gob Squad, founded at Nottingham Trent University in the early 1990 s, have
largely been overlooked within compendiums on participatory performance.
While Claudia Georgia’s book Liveness on Stage: Intermedial Challenges in Con-
temporary British Theatre and Performance (2014) thoughtfully explores the co-
presence of performers and spectators within a number of Gob Squad’s produc-
tions, the practice is analysed in the context of intermediality rather than ethics
and does not include the two case studies at the centre of my examination. This
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article aims to highlight that Gob Squad continues to be at the forefront of experi-
ments with the audience in contemporary British theatre, as illustrated by the
productions under discussion.
In Ethical Speculations (2015), Mireia Aragay acknowledges that theatre stu-
dies scholarship has been a latecomer to discourse on ethics within the human-
ities (Aragay and Monforte 3). Nicholas Ridout’s monograph Theatre and Ethics
(2009) is the first book to address the topic directly. Ridout suggests that one
might think about ethics as the process of working out on what basis we decide
what is good or bad, and what gives us the capacity to make those judgements
(Theatre and Ethics 11). However, this calculation is especially complex for partic-
ipant-spectators, as “alongside the ‘parts’ created for us by the performers are
other habitual, sticky roles, including that of spectator” (Heddon, Iball, Zerihan
121). This raises the issue of how participants judge their performance and the
performance. Additionally, how do watching-spectators evaluate their experi-
ence, and what and who is being critiqued? As my analysis will evidence, the
status of ethics and aesthetics within participatory work can be a source of ten-
sion for audience members. Furthermore, it has been the focus of much academic
debate (Jacques Rancière, The Emancipated Spectator; Claire Bishop, Artificial
Hells; Jen Harvie, Fair Game; Gareth White, Audience Participation; and Adam
Alston, Beyond Immersive Theatre).
From the early 2000 s onwards, there has been a burgeoning interest in audi-
ence participation from theatre and performance makers, curators, academics
and commentators. Nevertheless, there is a dearth of research dedicated to how
ethics is constituted within participatory performance, and the ways in which this
can be unsettled by varying forms of transgressive spectatorship. This article aims
to make an original and significant contribution to knowledge in the fields of
theatre and performance by addressing these essential areas of study.
Over the course of the paper, I will construct a theoretical framework for the
study of ethics in participatory performance by bringing together multiple per-
spectives and critical concepts emerging from theatre and performance studies,
the contemporary visual arts, and philosophy, in dialogue with my embodied ex-
periences as a spectator. Together these varying insights aim to advance under-
standing of the complex interrelationship between ethics and audience participa-
tion. I begin by recognising that the ethics of spectatorship in performance has
evolved from the theatre etiquette of the late nineteenth century (see Heim 64–
84) to a less certain conception within contemporary theatre today. As the argu-
ment advances it considers how Gob Squad’s work responds to the ethical debate
surrounding the delegation of labour to spectators, the perception of participation
as a “luxury game” (see Bishop, “Outsourcing Authenticity” 114), and the para-
doxical staging of authenticity. In order to offer a deeper understanding of how
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ethics is manifested in participatory performance, I will explicate a double dimen-
sion to the constitution of ethics, underscored by both the ‘spectator within’ and
‘ethics as encounter,’ drawing on the writing of Nicholas Ridout (2009) and the
corresponding concepts offered by Erving Goffmann (1959).
Later, I will examine those occasions when spectators re-configure their rela-
tionship to participation, unsettling the ethical framework for the performance. My
analysis will highlight three types of transgressive spectatorship; the ‘mis-specta-
tor’ as defined by Ridout (2012), the ‘errant spectator’ identified by Adam Alston
(2016), andmy own definition of the ‘dis-spectator.’
The term ‘dis-spectator’echoesRidout’smodellingof the ‘mis-spectator,’while
distinguishing a new categorisation of audience member who deliberately chal-
lenges the structures and processes of the performance. The ‘dis’ derives from the
term ‘dissent’ and the closely related ‘dissident’ to denote a spectator who has dis-
sented from themajority of the audience to exceed or to disrupt the limits of partic-
ipation. Indeed, one might also observe a correlation with the slang expression
‘diss’ as shorthand for ‘disrespect’ and to classify a put-down. However, typically
the dis-spectator operates at a playful level, with a view to have a bit of fun rather
than to ‘diss’ theperformance (causeoffence) or to creatediscord.Adegreeof open-
ness in the composite meaning of ‘dis-spectator’ takes into consideration that this
mode of transgression exists on a continuum and is informed by a range of motiva-
tions. In this regard, I have developed a taxonomy of dissident spectatorship that
outlines varying levels of transgressive behaviour from testing the boundaries of
participation to sabotaging the framework that maintains the performance. Lastly,
my analysis will call attention to a lack of consideration given to care and responsi-
bility in participation, which can leave participants in a vulnerable position.
Towards an Ethics of Participation
Ethics permeates all aspects of participatory performance; from the aspiration to
give the audience increased freedom, to the code of practice that governs their
interaction, and the standards by which the performance is valued. In turn, par-
ticipation raises the ethical stakes in contemporary theatre and performance, pro-
ducing some of the most exciting and dynamic art forms and experiences of the
twenty-first century. Acknowledging that ethics are foundational to participatory
work, frequently underscored by a moral imperative towards a democratising of
the art-making process (Bishop, Participation 12), it is important to look at what
kind of ethics is being promoted.
Ethical frameworks are often founded on social consensus; thus, how to act is
typically fairly prescriptive. Theatre etiquette is the most recognisable system of
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ethical behaviour in performance. Its origins are consistent with, but not limited
to, the introduction of electric lighting in theatres in the 1880 s. The ability to low-
er the houselights on the audience resulted in their previously noisy and demon-
strative behaviour being faded into the darkness (Heim 64). By the latter half of
the twentieth century, laughter and applause were typically the only permissible
signs of audience engagement with a performance. However, the growth of partic-
ipatory practices from the late 1990 s onwards has served to rethink audience be-
haviour, casting theatre etiquette or ethics into a period of uncertainty.
This does not mean that spectatorship in these works is without rules. On the
contrary, participation is underpinned by a tacit agreement that spectators will
accept the rules of the performance. But, these rules are usually specific to an
individual performance or artist/company’s style; therefore, they are lacking the
same level of convention for the audience. Still, at the same time, there is a strong
impulse to “give good audience” and to participate in normative assumptions
about the work, perhaps invoking the notion of an “ideal audience-participant”
(Heddon, Iball and Zerihan 124).
There are also times when the instructions for a participatory work are delib-
erately opaque or open to interpretation, in an attempt to offer greater agency to
the spectator. According to Ridout: “It is in the situation of doubt, in the moment
of choice, when you ask yourself, ‘How shall I act?’, that you are opening up the
space of ethics” (Theatre and Ethics 12). Similarly, Tony Fisher contends that par-
ticipation has the capacity to interrogate “the arraignment of power” by opening
up a “space of speech” (25): an opening where established structures are sus-
pended to allow alternative models of democratic politics and resistance to be
realised. Moreover, it can be reasoned that it is amidst this ethical ambiguity that
one finds the ‘antagonism’ that Claire Bishop has called for in socially engaged art
(see Bishop, “Antagonism”).
As Ridout observes, social engagement is an area of convergence between
theatre and ethics, as theatre regularly dramatises moral and social issues (The-
atre and Ethics 13). He states: “Theatre inserts its ethical questions into the lives of
its spectators in a situation in which those spectators are unusually conscious of
their own status as spectators, and thus as people who may exercise ethical
judgement” (15). Indeed, the meeting of theatre and ethics underpins the frame-
work for participation in Gob Squad’s War and Peace, with performers posing a
series of principled questions to the salon participant-spectators. These questions
included: “Two-hundred years from now, what do you think the writers of 2216
will say about these times that we are living in?” The dual position of making a
judgement at the same time as being judged heightens the participant’s aware-
ness of their social responsibility and serves to magnify the potency of ethics in
performance. What is more, it unsettles the established distinction between the
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one who ‘acts’ and the one who ‘judges’ in the theatre, distinguished by the roles
of ‘performer’ and ‘spectator.’
It can be said that the reconfiguration of these parts has served to democratise
and revitalise the contemporary theatre scene. Nonetheless, there is a developing
scepticism about the so-called “emancipated spectator,” to use Rancière’s term,
and their role as co-producer of theperformance. Rancièrehas observedan increas-
ing tendency amongst contemporary practitioners to get the spectator to do some-
thing, to move from being passive to active, even if they don’t know exactly what
theywant the spectator to do (“Emancipated Spectator” 277). He has led the charge
to contest the presupposition that a participant-spectator is an emancipated-spec-
tator. In doing so, Rancière has challenged theway inwhich the established binary
oppositions of “viewing/knowing, appearance/reality, activity/passivity” render
“the spectator seated in her place as inactive” (The Emancipated Spectator 12).
Following Rancière, Matthew Reason considers: “in the legacy of an overly
comfortable binary between active and passive spectatorship” there is a belief
that: “performances that engage audiences actively through participation also
emancipate and empower and are consequently radically liberating” (272). In ac-
tuality, participation is frequently subject to imposed sanctions by the practi-
tioner, and there are varying levels of agency offered to spectators. In this way,
participatory works can be prescriptive and stage the spectacle of agency, rather
than a more revolutionary agentive experience.
Furthermore, as participation becomes normalised through its growing popu-
larity and the emergence of “expert participant-spectators” (see Jordan 112–113),
the space of ethics may well be closing. Reflecting on participation, Bishop recalls
“[y]ou hear yourself speaking in clichés, unable to break the conceptual structure
that the artist has set in place” (“Outsourcing Authenticity” 120). In short, just as a
mainstream audience has learnt how to perform its role through watching the
behaviour of other audience members and abiding by the given rules of theatre
etiquette, spectators of participatory theatre can also find themselves performing
in predetermined ways.
Ethics, Delegated Performance and Authenticity
As Jen Harvie has observed, in contemporary theatre “audiences are increasingly
regularly called on to participate in, contribute to and at least co-create the per-
formance also for free and sometimes, more precisely, at the cost of a fee” (28).
Although, she is quick to acknowledge that in many instances, audience members
are not so much “passively exploited” as “actively exploit” the opportunity to be
performing-spectators and part-time artists (28, emphasis original).
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Gob Squad was an early adopter of audience participation in contemporary
performance, beginning with their piece Room Service in 2003. In my interview
with Gob Squad performer Sharon Smith (a core member of the company since
2007), she recalled that: “[w]e wanted to bring the real world inside the theatre,
or still have a connection to the outside via some sort of media or technology
which would allow this leak. And that eventually became the audience them-
selves” (2). Gob Squad’s approach corresponds with a reconsideration of ‘authen-
ticity’ by contemporary artists, as noted by Bishop, which mobilised a shift away
from the artist’s body towards “delegated performance” and “outsourcing
authenticity” by using other people’s bodies (“Outsourcing Authenticity” 110).
This reassessment of authenticity is indicative of the way that this term and the
related notions of being real, true and genuine are mutable and contested con-
cepts. My usage of the term authenticity is consistent with Bishop’s reading, while
also recognising an adjusted form of authenticity when authenticity is performed.
Delegated performance would appear to exemplify sculptor and performance
artist Joseph Beuys’s metaphor that ‘everyone is an artist’ by inviting the audience
to contribute to the art making process. As Harvie puts it: “Delegated art and per-
formance thus celebrate amateurism, doing art for the pleasure of it” (36). Accord-
ingly, Smith maintains that Gob Squad actively avoid expert participant-specta-
tors precisely because they lack authenticity, stating: “we definitely would not
choose the person who looks like they’re saying choose me, choose me. And that’s
because if they start acting up on stage they will not look good” (10). Expertise
has a paradoxical relationship to participation, as it is often implied that it is
neither necessary nor desirable, potentially undoing the authenticity of the work
or contaminating the “leak” that Smith refers to. Simultaneously, there is a view
that everyone has the expertise to get involved; thus, participation can be seen as
a great equaliser.
While expert participant-spectators may not be intentionally sought after by
practitioners, in reality they make up a notable share of a contemporary theatre
audience and are self-made through their learnt behaviour of typified responses
to participation. Therefore, it may be concluded that to avoid nurturing practised
participants and an established notion of participatory performance etiquette,
practitioners need to keep changing the rules or opening up ‘the space of ethics’
in which those rules might be reinterpreted. I suggest it is in this liminal space,
permeated with the potential for failure and transgression, that participation is at
its most alive.
In contrast to conventional theatre, where actors pretend to be other people,
part of the appeal of audience participation in contemporary theatre is the prom-
ise of authenticity. André Antoine’s assertion that we need a new breed of actors
“who are spontaneous and authentic, in touch with reality through and through”
The Ethics of Participation 193
Bereitgestellt von | De Gruyter / TCS
Angemeldet
Heruntergeladen am | 21.11.19 15:37
(xvii) might well be attributed to the participant-spectators who have emerged on
to the stage. In this way, the ethics of participation may suggest that a ‘good’
performance is interchangeable with the idea of an ‘authentic’ performance. Andy
Lavender has noted that ‘authenticity’ has become one of the defining terms of
contemporary performance practice (25). In The Experience Economy: A New Per-
spective, Albert Boswijk and his co-authors consider that “Authenticity is about
rediscovering values and traditions and interpreting them in a new way within a
progressive context. The individual is looking for genuineness and originality: for
the core and essence of things” (46). I propose that perhaps the real art in partici-
patory performance is being able to perform your authentic self without looking
like you are performing.
While the notion of ‘staging authenticity’might be argued as being inauthen-
tic, it is essentially the combination of two different types of authenticity – stem-
ming from the heart and the head. This hybrid form of authenticity is both emo-
tional and logical, as the participant on stage is very much the same as their orig-
inal self, but nonetheless different. On the one hand they recognise that their
genuineness is sought, but on the other hand they also see the need to customise
their authenticity for the audience and the performance. What is presented be-
comes an adjusted form of authenticity (not unlike the filtered photos on Insta-
gram or a carefully worded Tweet), which can also be seen to correspond with
Erving Goffman’s concept of ‘front,’ discussed later.
Instead of negating the scepticism that has been imposed on delegated per-
formance, Gob Squad’s Western Society (2013; still ongoing) and War and Peace
(2016; still ongoing) call attention to the exploitative potential of participation. In
the summer of 2015, I attended a performance ofWestern Society at the Southbank
Centre, London. The performance uses spectators to re-enact a barely watched
YouTube video of a family karaoke party, to offer a portrait of twenty-first-century
society. The later production of War and Peace develops some of the dramaturgi-
cal devices employed in Western Society. For instance, the VIP table for partici-
pants in Western Society has evolved into the salon in War and Peace. These two
performances are pertinent to my analysis because a key feature within these
works is the way in which they directly address ethics and self-reflexively stage
and challenge their adoption of participation as a privileged form of spectator-
ship.
As innovators of experiments with the audience, Gob Squad’s embodied as-
sessment of participatory practice emerges from the fact that the collective is part
of its trajectory, rather than a reflection of its popularity. Although Harvie warns
that delegated performance may risk replicating exploitative and manipulative
contemporary labour relations, she also notes that “at its best, it draws self-reflex-
ive critical attention to that risk” (29). This echoes Bishop’s contention that the
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strongest examples of delegated performances “produce disruptive events that tes-
tify to a shared reality between viewers and performers that throw into question
agreed ways of thinking about subjectivity, ethics, and economics,” rather than
staging “themere spectacle of participation” (“Outsourcing Authenticity” 123).
One of the ways in which Gob Squad’s productions offer a self-reflexive cri-
tique of delegated performance is by emphasising participation as a place of priv-
ilege. Furthermore, the audience is made consciously aware of their complicity in
the artifice and inequality of social power relations at play when participation is
present. This is at its most perceptible in the VIP status that is awarded to partic-
ipant-spectators in Western Society and the special treatment afforded to those
invited to join the salon duringWar and Peace. In both instances participants are
given access to a designated guest area where they are presented with champagne
and other refreshments. This notable image of material privilege also converges
with Bishop’s observation that unlike the inexpensive performance art of the
1960 s and 1970 s, which was produced quickly and mostly utilised the artist’s
body, “delegated performance, by contrast, is a luxury game” (“Outsourcing
Authenticity” 114).
This “luxury” is exemplified by interactive theatre company You Me Bum
Bum Train’s (YMBBT) large-scale immersive experiences for one ‘passenger’ at a
time. Tickets average at around £50 and have become hot commodities, as they
can only be purchased if the would-be theatregoer is successfully selected from a
ballot. However, like both Punchdrunk’s and Secret Cinema’s immersive produc-
tions, this price point is a barrier for much of the public. Moreover, the perception
of YMBBT as elitist is underscored further by the fact that the company actively
seek celebrity endorsement, allowing high profile individuals such as Prince Har-
ry and Madonna to bypass the usual lottery process.
In contrast, Gob Squad’s performances do not profess to be immersive or a
once-in-a-lifetime experience; the action tends to unfold within the duration of a
few hours, supported by a simple set design that includes the use of a projection
screen and a selection of props and costumes. Consequently, the tickets are on
average priced at around £15; therefore, they do not actualise Bishop’s notion of
delegated performance as a “luxury game.” Instead, works such as Western So-
ciety and War and Peace are self-consciously aware of the “game,” which they
play out through the theatrical device of the VIP table/salon to present a physical
manifestation of participation as a place of privilege. The manner in which partic-
ipant-spectators are treated as VIPs (in Western Society) serves to magnify the
artificiality of their newly elevated status. As Smith states, “the VIP table is very
cheap; we’re being very cynical about the luxury” (6). Even so, these designated
areas also have another purpose, by enabling the Gob Squad performers to have
an intimate exchange with the participants, Smith explains:
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[W]e want to frame their presence on the stage in a way that means we can have a real
conversation, even if there’s headphones and instructions and silly costumes and artifice
involved. That we can exist there, and we can really be there, and when we look at each
other – we see each other, and when we speak to each other – we’re having an actual con-
versation. (7)
Yet, although this exchange may foster a closer relationship between the partici-
pant-spectators and the Gob Squad performers, it arguably has the opposite effect
for the watching-spectators. As observers of the interaction between Gob Squad
and the participants, we become aware that their proximity affords them special
knowledge of the performance; secret conversations out of earshot and refresh-
ments that we cannot taste. It can be difficult watching these intimate exchanges
not to feel a pang of jealousy, as someone left on the outside looking in. The great-
er the proximity participants have to the performance, through these private mo-
ments, the further away the watching audience feels. At the same time, we are
unable to forget that we might have been one of the participants and that they
were once, and will be again, one of us. Therefore, as we observe our performing
counterparts on stage, we are with them, albeit from a seat in the dark.
In Western Society, Gob Squad performer Sarah Thom (who founded the col-
lective in 1992) markedly declared to the auditorium that “sometimes it’s good to
sit in the dark and watch.” This statement prompted me to ask Smith if a spectator
can be emancipated and actively engaged, as Rancière suggests, whilst staying in
their seat:
Yes, unanimously yes. Before the audience gets involved in the work we still hope to work
with the semi-improvisational structures ... we are live writing that work in real time and,
therefore, the room is active in that writing. And that involves the audience and, therein, it
feels different ... they’re definitely activated even if they’re just sitting there. Because they’re
affecting ... if they sneeze or laugh or walk out ... or not. Whether they are a small audience
or a large audience ... it’s felt in Gob Squad’s work, it’s not ignored. (Smith 8)
The semi-improvisational structures highlighted by Smith also allow the collec-
tive to offer some agency and autonomy for the participant-spectators. Even
though Gob Squad’s framework for participation operates within a structure that
determines where the performance is going from beginning, middle to end,
“there’s room for play and for receiving signals from the outside” (Smith 4).
It is worthmentioning that the interpretive decisions that the performing spec-
tator makes, such as the way in which they answer questions posed to them and
how they deliver their responses, is not subject to directorial scrutiny. In the ab-
sence of editing and refinement, there are moments when their answers may feel
weak and their speech uncertain, unrefined or wooden. But, instead of being con-
demnedas a ‘bad’performance, on the contrary, thesehallmarks of an amateur can
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be seen to amplify the liveness and authenticity of the event: the notion that it is
happening in ‘real-time’ and with ‘real’ people. When we critique the performance
both during and after its realisation, participation is its own criteria. By this I mean
that our evaluation is less about the quality of the participant’s performance, and
more about their authenticity; the degree to which they committed to the task; and
how their participation translated intomeaning and experience.
The Q&A segments that are interspersed within the fabric of both Western
Society andWar and Peace is a clear example of the way that Gob Squad are “live
writing” the work, as well as making visible the conception of performance as a
space for ethics. Questions such as “Do you believe in progress” and “What is the
name of the first French suicide bomber” posed by Gob Squad performers to par-
ticipants (War and Peace) bring into being “the staged and the spontaneous”
(Bishop, “Outsourcing Authenticity” 121). A degree of authorial control (the ques-
tions) is fundamental to the structure of the exchange, but the end result is largely
reliant on the skills of the participant to meet or even exceed the expectations of
Gob Squad and the viewing audience.
Nevertheless, the artificiality of the theatrical setting, and the close-up shots
of the participant seen on the projection screen (War and Peace), all at once frame
participation and draw attention to the inauthenticity of the participant’s sponta-
neity (Bishop, “Outsourcing Authenticity” 121). This underscores my earlier state-
ment that the art of spectator-participation resides in the participant’s ability to
stage their spontaneity while holding on to their authenticity. As Bishop notes,
some of the most powerful instances of delegated performance are those that
“permit ‘authenticity’ (subjects that are engaged, passionate, fragile, complex) to
emerge within situations of intense artificiality” (“Outsourcing Authenticity” 120).
Additionally, the proximity of performers and participants, most notably during
the Q&A scenes, can be said to challenge relational oppositions by unsettling the
previously established ‘us’ and ‘them’ divide between theatre performers and
spectators. At the same time, as David Beech notes, this may establish a new ‘us’
and ‘them’ in the form of those that do and those that don’t participate (25).
Ethics and the Spectator Within
Building on the understanding that ethics and authenticity both frame and com-
plicate participatory performance, I will now take a closer look at the internalised
set of values that guide one’s ethical behaviour in the situation of participation.
Building on Ridout’s theorising, my analysis will outline a double dimension to
the ethics of participation: the first is concerned with the self, and the second is
about everyone else.
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Beginning with the self, Ridout draws on philosopher Adam Smith’s (1759)
writing to suggest that “we judge our own behaviour in the guise of an imaginary
‘spectator’ within us” (Ridout, Theatre and Ethics 33). The principle that under-
lines this concept is that we each possess an “impartial spectator” (35) inside our-
selves, and it is to them that we direct our behaviour for ethical judgement. Our
perception of whether or not the ‘spectator within’ approves or disapproves of our
actions will determine whether or not we consider our behaviour to be right or
wrong. In addition, as Ridout elucidates, a “doubling of the self” into “the one
who judges and the one whose actions are judged” requires an emotional connec-
tion to oneself and an element of disconnection which enables enough distance
for reason to emerge (35). Reflecting on my own experiences of participation, I
propose that the spectator within also has a capacity to speak directly to us (“go
on take a risk”) or to express our inner feelings (“don’t pick me”).
Furthermore, this inner spectator is often influenced by a process of “introjec-
tion” in which they internalise “once prescribed and now habitual behaviours
carried by us all” (Heddon, Iball and Zerihan 125). These introjects frequently
guide our moral compass and illustrate how one should act. Indeed, as Heddon
and her co-authors have observed, “[c]ommitment to our ‘introjects’ (‘I should be,
I must be, I ought ...’) can be so strong that they often have the power to override
our interest in our own well-being” (125).
Moreover, another influencing factor emerges from the way that participation
is in many ways extorted from the audience, demanding “a ‘special complicity’
with an aesthetic situation,” as Alston has argued (“Audience Participation” 129;
see also Fried 127). Hence, the spectator within may feel further compelled in the
situation of participation to prioritise the performance above their own welfare
and in spite of their fears. In turn, this raises the question of who should assume
ethical responsibility and care for the spectator during and after their participa-
tory experience, and in the event of ‘participation gone wrong.’
There are also times when an introject clashes with our original impulse;
thus, what we want to do and what we think we should do are at odds with each
other. This can result in the participant offering an expected rather than a truthful
response. Looking back on my experience as an audience member at War and
Peace, it is this clash that gave rise to a feeling of inadequacy, as my impulse not
to participate conflicted with the introject that I must ‘give good audience.’ During
the opening sequence when performers introduced potential participants on
stage, I noticed Gob Squad’s Simon Will close at hand, and I actively avoided
making eye contact with him. As a feeling of foreboding gathered in the pit of my
stomach, three words ran through my mind endlessly repeating: “Don’t pick me.”
I questioned what I would say about myself; the truth, or a better, funnier version
of the truth? I reasoned that it would be easier and safer to remain seated in the
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auditorium. Later, my trepidation towards participation would be validated, but
at the time I was a little disappointed in myself. The omnipresence of the ideal
spectator is never far away, beseeching me to cede my will and forget my fears.
Additionally, developing Ridout’s theorising, I suggest that there is an ‘ideal
spectator within’ that speaks to the interrelationship between how we want to be
perceived and our ethical compass. In the example ofWar and Peace, the first ap-
pearance of my ‘ideal spectator within’ occurred when I purchased my ticket. It is
often at thismomentwhenwemust decidewhere wewould like to be positioned in
relation to the performance, and perhaps how we would wish to be seen. Tickets
were priced between £14–16 and I selected the slightly more expensive seats, close
to the front row. I recognised that my proximity to the performance might increase
the possibility of being chosen to participate, and I sought to present an idealised
impression of myself as one that would ‘give good audience.’ As Goffman reflects,
citingsociologistCharlesCooley:“Ifwenever tried toseemalittlebetter thanweare,
howcouldwe improve or ‘train ourselves from the outside inward?’” (Goffman 44).
It is at this juncture that I wish to introduce Erving Goffman’s notion of ‘front,’
outlined in The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (1956), as a useful concept in
establishing how impressionmanagement is a vital constituent in the ethics of par-
ticipation. Goffman determines that the impression given by an individual to ob-
servers is decided by “the expression that he gives, and the expression that he gives
off” (14, emphasis original). In the first instance an impression is given through the
use of recognisable signs to convey information about one’s character to others. In
the second occurrence the sign activity is indicative of the character, or given off
rather than intentionally expressed. However, it should be noted that an individual
can deliberatelymisinform their audience through the signs that they give and give
off, by way of deceit or feigning (Goffman 14).
Goffman employs the term ‘front’ to define the largely fixed element of an
individual’s performance which works to manage the impression being made on
those observing (32). He suggests that the performance of front can be divided
into parts, which include setting, appearance and manner: “setting” refers to the
scenery and stage props that frame the performance of front; “appearance” con-
cerns those personal signs which indicate the individual’s social status; and
“manner” relates to those signs which are indicative of the role that the individual
expects to have in the unfolding event (Goffman 32–35). What is more, Goffman
acknowledges that we often expect some coherence between these three compo-
nents of front (35). In other words, how an individual expresses themselves is
typically governed by the concurrent tendencies of where they are, their social
standing, and how they expect to be treated. It could also be said that relations
amongst these three factors provide the basis on which the spectator within se-
lects the individual’s social front and critiques the performance.
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For Goffman, “fronts tend to be selected, not created” (38), and “become in-
stitutionalised in terms of the abstract stereotyped expectations to which [they
give] rise” (37). This notion resonates with the argument that as participatory per-
formance develops into a popular art form, it becomes entrenched with precon-
ceived ideas of how spectators should act. Therefore, the audience is likely to find
that there is a predetermined selection of fronts from which to choose, the most
recognisable of which are the watching-spectator and the participant-spectator,
although these positions will also be divided into a further assortment of fronts.
Reflecting on my presence in the audience for War and Peace, as opposed to
maintaining consistency between the varying parts of my front, my appearance
and manner arguably contradicted each other. The decision to purchase seats
close to the stage gives the impression of a social status that is imbued with a
desire to be seen, whereas my manner – avoiding the searching gaze of perfor-
mers in pursuit of willing participants – gives off a lack of confidence and a wish
to be left alone. However, despite my attempt to put on the front of an ideal spec-
tator, this impression was undermined by my overanalysis of the situation. Echo-
ing Rachel Gomme’s reflections on encountering one-to-one performance, my ex-
perience is already being defined by “my own preconceptions, including, for my-
self as seasoned spectator, a degree of critical detachment” (289). I concede that
the more knowledgeable about participation that I have become – its potential-
ities, limitations, expectations and risks – the less I am inclined to accept the
invitation. However, as I have previously discussed (see Jordan 112–113), there are
‘expert participant-spectators’ who foster a greater attachment to participation
precisely because of their accumulated experiences.
The artifice of social fronts is one of the themes explored in War and Peace,
most strikingly in the highly theatrical manufacturing of the fronts presented by
Napoleon, the Russian Tsar and Pierre Bezukhov, as we see their appearance and
manner altered to affect the impression that each of them gives and gives off. Also,
participant-spectators’ contribution to live writing the performance during the
Q&A sections is dependent on their inbuilt capacity to make judgements about
their front and to adapt it accordingly: to evoke their spectator within.
In the next part of my analysis, I will discuss how this process of ethical
judgement is mirrored in the watching-audience, who empathise with their per-
forming counterparts. It will examine how a relational dimension to participatory
performance shifts ethical responsibility away from being only about the self and
towards an ethical responsibility for someone else. As Ridout considers, “ethics
might in fact be all about everyone but yourself” (Theatre and Ethics 13).
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Ethics as Encounter
Emerging from Emmanuel Levinas’ writing on ethical thought, Ridout constructs
the concept of ‘ethics as encounter’ (see Levinas, Totality and Infinity; Levinas
Reader). He maintains that Levinasian ethics applied to performance “encourages
the spectator to stop seeing the performance as an exploration of his or her own
subjectivity and, instead, to take it as an opportunity to experience an encounter
with someone else” (Ridout, Theatre and Ethics 8). Clearly, this is a philosophy
that is epitomised in practice where an encounter with another is at the centre of
the work, such as in one-to-one performance. But it is also a belief which is fos-
tered in Gob Squad’s use of participation to strengthen the bond between those on
stage and those in the auditorium. As Smith distinguishes, this connection be-
tween participant-spectators and watching-spectators is expressed as
the ability to relate to that person because they’ve left one part of the auditorium and they’ve
gone to another part of the room ... they’ve crossed over that line. And they’ve kind of taken
a little bit of the audience with them, so there’s a certain sort of extension of themselves
maybe into the performance space. (3)
In my examination of the ‘spectator within’ and Goffman’s notion of ‘front’ I have
talked about the way in which impressions of the self are managed. I now wish to
offerasecondconceptionof the term ‘impression,’ interpretedbyRidoutasa formof
physiological communication between peoplewhich in turn underpins empathy.
Following Ridout, due to the fact that on the whole humans possess compar-
able qualities and feelings, an understanding of someone else’s situation can ‘im-
press’ itself on an individual’s own person. Ridout writes that in this doubling
process, what someone else is doing or feeling “is ‘impressed’ upon me; it is like
the action of a printing press on the surface of a body. As a result of this impres-
sion, I experience the feeling along with the other person. Literally, I feel the same
thing [...] from one body to another” (Theatre and Ethics 34). For Ridout, it is this
embodied connection that enables us to feel satisfaction when we perceive some-
one doing something good, or dissatisfaction when they imprint an act of wrong-
doing (34). On this basis, it is in our encountering of one another that human
beings establish “a capacity for ethical judgement which is a natural extension of
their existence as physiological beings” (34–35). It might be supposed that our
predisposition for empathy underlies our spectator within, as an inbuilt mecha-
nism for assessing the way in which one might be judged by those on which one
may impress. This implies, as Ridout muses, that ethics is always in the end about
someone else.
Indeed, an example of the interdependency between individual and rela-
tional ethics is actualised in the way that participants improvise during the Q&A
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sections within Gob Squad’s performances. In these moments, the participants
will instantly separate themselves into two roles; first, they need to assess how to
respond to the question; secondly, they must refer their response inwards to the
spectator within. For the spectator within, this is a self-reflexive process based on
their previous communication with others. In short, ‘ethics as encounter’ fuels the
ethical judgement within us. In an interview situation, there is an almost instan-
taneous process of improvising our answer and filtering that answer based on the
impression that we would wish to make. This process coincides with the duality of
emotion and reason that underscore ethical judgement. Of course, there are times
when our ability to be spontaneous hinders the effectiveness of our impression.
There are also instances when our inner spectator gets it wrong, which might
occur when we are not familiar with the other people that are in attendance, thus,
misjudging what the reception will be. Then there are those occasions when an
individual wilfully goes against the ethical code generally accepted by others, as
discussed later in the article.
In the context of the theatre, I wish to propose that empathy as a process of
identification with another is made stronger when the person on stage belongs to
the same ‘team’ as the watching-spectator. Contemplating audience participation
in Gob Squad’s productions, Smith remarks, “once somebody does go in, you
tend to think about yourself don’t you? Like how would I feel if that was me ...
you’re on the same team ... you’re kind of gunning for them” (7–8). The concept of
‘teams’ is usefully explored by Goffman, who uses the term “to refer to any set of
individuals who cooperate in staging a single routine” (85). In this way, the audi-
ence can be understood as a team, even if the team-mates perform varying roles
on a continuum of interactivity.
For Goffman, “whether the members of a team stage similar individual per-
formances or stage dissimilar performances which fit together into a whole, an
emergent team impression arises” (85). In addition, it is clear that members of the
same team will have a notable relationship to each other, as each member is re-
liant on the good behaviour of their team-mates, establishing a “bond of recipro-
cal dependence” (88). Furthermore, this cooperation is reinforced by a given “re-
ciprocal familiarity,” which “is automatically extended and received as soon as
the individual takes a place on the team” (88). However, Goffman stresses that
should a person go outside the boundaries of acceptable team behaviour or what
we might call ethics, “giving the show away or forcing it to take a particular turn,”
they are still considered part of the team (88). This reinforces my assertion that
even when spectators cross the border and undertake a performance role, they are
nonetheless part of ‘team audience.’
Moreover, part of the performing participants’ dramatic effect derives from
the fact that they appear to be acting beyond the pale of their team’s typical be-
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haviour; consequently, the other audience members are compelled to reconsider
their own conduct. Nevertheless, I suggest that on the other side of the border the
participant-spectators form a new team, which complicates rather than abolishes
their membership of team audience. This is contrary to the view that the partici-
pants temporarily join the team of company performers, which I refute on the
basis that they are only given access to the ‘front region’ of the performers’ terri-
tory. Goffman uses the term ‘front region’ to describe the place where the perfor-
mance is staged and ‘back region’ as an area that knowingly contradicts the per-
formance given out front. He observes that it is in the back region that the produc-
tion is assembled, where “illusions and impressions are openly constructed”
(Goffman 114). Even when the stage includes part of the back region, as we find
in the VIP/salon area of Gob Squad’s performances, where the performers can be
observed removing parts of their costume (Western Society), taking refreshments
and chatting off script, it is a theatricalised presentation of behind the scenes and
not the backstage proper.
In Goffman’s hypothesising, the constitution of a team, with its “reciprocal
dependence,” cuts across social and political divides. Similarly, in Western So-
ciety, Gob Squad make reference to the participants as people who are sharing in
this unique experience together; people who otherwise may not come into con-
tact; people who have left their theatre companions behind to form new bonds in
the “new world.” The evolving party on stage becomes a temporary utopia, where
cultural and social preconceptions no longer have relevance. In the newly formed
team of participants an impression is quickly established, albeit one based on
‘special complicity’ and ‘giving good audience.’
However, as I have intimated, this new team formed in the new world does
not deny the pre-existing team from which they came: team audience. Further-
more, according to Goffman, when two teams come into contact they tend to
maintain their established appearance, as well as supporting the impression that
the other team are keen to uphold. At the same time, the relationship between the
teams may be reorganised during moments of crisis (Goffman 166), and there are
times when performing-spectators and watching-spectators can deviate from the
agreed team impression.
Participation Gone Wrong and Dis-spectatorship
In general, artists do what they can to limit the possibility of participation going
wrong, which typically includes some kind of informal casting. InWar and Peace
this process was made explicit through the initial interviews with audience mem-
bers; however, in spite of an artist’s best efforts, there are times when miss-cast-
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ing occurs, possibly where a person’s ‘front’ has been feigned or misread. The
result is various forms of transgressive spectatorship.
As I disentangle ‘participation gonewrong,’ I arrive at three types of transgres-
sive spectatorship; Ridout’s ‘mis-spectator,’ Alston’s ‘errant spectator,’ and my
own category of the ‘dis-spectator.’Ridout identifies the ‘mis-spectator’ as an audi-
encememberwhose lack of expertise leads them tomisinterpret a performance and
to react in a way that is outside of typical audience behaviour. However, corre-
sponding with Bishop’s call for ‘antagonism,’ Ridout proposes that “a measure of
inexpertise may be crucial to an interruption of the consensus around value to
which experts, both performance makers and spectators, routinely contribute, a
consensus in which we agree only to see and hear what we already know” (“Mis-
spectatorship” 173). Similarly, Alston suggests that a spectator’s mistakes are not
always to the detriment of the performance and canbe “mistakes thatmake” (“Mak-
ing Mistakes” 67, emphasis original). He distinguishes the ‘errant spectator’ to de-
fine a participatory audience member who has strayed from the intended course of
action (“MakingMistakes”65),whichemerges from “a surplusof expertise, reading
too well and taking too far an invitation to get involved” (67). I suggest that exper-
tise can be a source of audience fear, both in terms of a lack and a surplus. Fear of
not knowing what to do, of getting it wrong or doing it badly. Fear of knowing too
much, of recognising the tactics and the predetermined result and performing too
well, undermining the expected genuineness of one’s participation.
It is at this stage in the paper that I will turn to the conspicuous example of
participation gone wrong that I witnessed during War and Peace the likes of
which I have not seen before or since. This moment interrupted the consensus of
the audience and represented a crisis in the ethics of participation. It could be
said that the trouble began in the casting, or what might be considered mis-cast-
ing, as over the course of War and Peace it transpired that one of the chosen par-
ticipant-spectators had been a political party candidate during the previous gen-
eral election. Therefore, when Gob Squad’s Simon asked the participant a series of
questions, she offered very full responses and seemed to have her own agenda,
taking up quite a lot of stage time and appearing difficult for him to rein in. This
prompted a group of three audience members, who were sitting in front of me, to
heckle her, shouting comments and insisting that she speed up her answers.
I propose that the three hecklers demonstrated the behaviour of what I have
termed the ‘dis-spectator.’ Unlike the errant spectator or the mis-spectator there is
nothing mistaken about the conduct of the dis-spectator. I suggest that an invita-
tion to participate can bring out the ‘dis-spectator within us,’ especially when
fuelled by what Alston has referred to as a hedonistic and narcissistic desire for
participation (“Audience Participation” 130). This form of transgressive spectator-
ship exists on a continuum (see Figure 1).
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Figure 1: Taxonomy of Dis-spectatorship
At level 1: ‘Testing,’ the dis-spectator displays low-level dissent from their fellow
spectators. They might be seen questioning an immersive performer on their back
story to try to catch them out or checking for potential weaknesses and ambigu-
ities within the parameters for participation.
At level 2: ‘Playing,’ the dis-spectator has dissented further from the rest of
the audience through their desire to lightly experiment with the framework for
participation out of a sense of mischief. Rather like the “High Places Phenome-
non” (Hames et al), where one gets a sudden compulsion to jump when they are
in a high place, some spectators get an impulse to be disobedient in the situation
of participation. If “[a]n urge to jump affirms the urge to live,” as the title of
Hames and her co-authors’ study suggests, I propose that an urge to play affirms
the urge to perform. Level 2 dis-spectators are frequently fellow artists and perfor-
mers and will almost certainly volunteer themselves if participation is invited.
However, while they may play with the rules for participation, they are careful not
to upset the structure in such a way that it may negatively impact the perfor-
mance.
Conversely, dis-spectators that operate at level 3: ‘Disruption’ deliberately
and visibly rebel against the performance, redirecting the focus to their agenda
but stopping short of undoing the performance altogether. An infamous example
of level 3 dis-spectatorship was displayed by Jarvis Cocker during his 1996 BRIT
Awards invasion of Michael Jackson’s performance of “Earth Song.” While his
moment of protest was disruptive, it did not prohibit the performance from con-
tinuing. This example is also indicative of the way in which this taxonomy might
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usefully be applied to other instances of performance outside of participatory
practice.
At the highest level 4: ‘Sabotage,’ the dis-spectator attempts to stage an inter-
vention that threatens to unravel the whole performance. Instigators of riots and
acts of terror during performance constitute level 4, although relentless heckling
may also incapacitate a production if the performer(s) become too distracted.
In War and Peace, the dis-spectators corresponded with the third level of the
continuum, as their behaviour was focused on disrupting one participant rather
than bringing down the entire show. Yet, the disorderly conduct of the hecklers
created a palpable tension within the auditorium, which crossed the border into
the performance. It was apparent that neither the audience nor the performers
knew what to do. And, it would be dishonest if I didn’t admit that there was
something thrilling about watching this crisis unfold: witnessing Simon strug-
gling to rein in the overzealous interviewee at the same time as attempting to
ignore the shouts from the disgruntled trio. It magnified the liveness of the ex-
perience and arguably reconfigured the performance as a space for discord and
‘antagonism.’
Audience members and Gob Squad performers alike were compelled to ques-
tion who is responsible for the performance; who is responsible for the partici-
pant-spectator; who is responsible for the hecklers; how do we bring resolution
to this situation; do we want to resolve this situation or is this what we have been
waiting for? After all, as Ridout tells us: “Theatre’s greatest ethical potential may
be found precisely at the moment when theatre abandons ethics” (Theatre and
Ethics 70). Nonetheless, despite the revolutionary possibilities, I found the con-
vergence of the ‘emancipated spectator’ into the ‘abandoned spectator’ troubling,
and I empathised with my team member on stage. Thankfully the participant ap-
peared unmoved by the abuse directed at her; no doubt a thick skin earned
through her campaigning as a politician.
Analysing more closely the newly formed team of dis-spectators, and putting
aside the possibility that the hecklers knew her in some way, I suggest that the
participant’s front indicated a lack of authenticity or vulnerability. In this way,
her professionalism denied the audience the celebrated impression of the ama-
teur as an artist. However, although the participant’s appearance and manner
suggested an expert participant-spectator, her apparent inability to underplay her
public front denotes inexpertness. Whether cast as an errant spectator who sur-
passed her role, or as a mis-spectator who overestimated how much to say, per-
haps in the eyes of the hecklers she threatened the consensus of the performance.
To this end, we may conclude that the hecklers sought to reclaim control of the
performance for the audience, but also on behalf of the performers – to break in
order tomake. Alternatively, perhaps they were objecting to the way that her pro-
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fessionalism and front undermined the authenticity of participation. Following
Goffman, it may be that their interruption was intended to reprimand their team
member for going outside of the typical standards of participation, even if this
created further disharmony in the performance.
Though I want to stress that the situation of hecklers inWar and Peace is very
rare, for me it evidences that the ethics of participation remains contested ground,
fraught with conflicting notions of responsibility and impression management. It
was striking that no-one intervened when the dis-spectators collectively berated
the participant-spectator, not the audience, not Gob Squad, and not the theatre
ushers. I argue that if a ‘special complicity’ is demanded of participants, special
care should be afforded to them. As interactive theatre makers Persis Jade
Maravala and Jorge Lopes Ramos of ZU-UK have asserted, the management of an
active audience “would benefit frommore rigorous investigation and care.” In my
attendance at participatory performances over the last ten years, the only after-
care that I have witnessed is in the form of the ad hoc “how was it for you?” chat
between artists and participants in the bar/cloakroom afterwards. More often
than not, any provision of ethical responsibility for the participant ends once the
experience is over.
I propose that theatre makers have an ethical responsibility to take care of
their spectators during and after their participatory experience. Examples of good
practice in this regard include YMBBT’s use of a recognisable distress code that
‘passengers’ should employ if their experience becomes too much, in the form of a
simple T-shape hand sign accompanied by the words ‘time out’ spoken three
times (Lawson). Also Tassos Stevens, director of interactive theatre company Co-
ney, advocates creating a space for participants to decompress post their partici-
patory experience. Indeed, there is a need for greater dissemination of these kinds
of practical strategies in the responsible management of audience participation
for all stages of the performance process.
In conclusion, over the course of the discussion I have offered a theoretical
framework for understanding the ethics of participation, drawing particularly on
the critical concepts of Ridout and Goffman. In doing so, I have shown how the
ethics of participation is a mutable construct that is about one’s own subjectivity,
and at the same time about our encounters with others. This double dimension is
further complicated by the way that impressions are managed and embodied
through the front that we give and give off and the ‘team(s)’ to which we belong.
If there is one attribute that the ethics of participation insists upon, it is the capac-
ity to spontaneously stage one’s authentic self. This serves as a reaction and re-
sistance to the concurrent dominance of social media where impressions are fil-
tered on Instagram and fronts are managed through Facebook updates and re-
tweets.
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My analysis has recognised how the ethics of participation increases the jeop-
ardy in performance, bringing into view participation gone wrong and the emer-
gence of the mis-spectator, the errant spectator, and the dis-spectator. I have out-
lined a taxonomy of dis-spectatorship to categorise the varying levels at which
audience members can challenge the framework for participation, from ‘testing’
the structure to ‘sabotage.’ Yet, I contend that a degree of ethical promiscuity is
part of participation’s vitality, which is in danger of being compromised if the
etiquette of engagement becomes too formulaic and spectators’ responses learnt.
Importantly, as Gob Squad illustrate, participation has the capacity to enable
strangers to meet and new political and social realities to emerge (if only for the
duration of the performance). Even so, just as Tolstoy’s War and Peace looks at
how one might live an ethical life in an ethically imperfect world, Gob Squad’s
War and Peace reveals the precarious relationship between ethics, participation
and performance.
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